This article focuses on what bodies know yet which cannot be expressed verbally. We started with a problem encountered during conventional interviewing in an ex-mining community in south Wales when some teen girls struggled to speak. This led us to focus on the body, corporeality and movement in improvisational dance workshops. By slowing down and speeding up video footage from the workshops, we notice movement patterns and speculate about how traces of gender body-movement practices developed within mining communities over time (...) become actualised in girls’ habitual movement repertoires. Inspired by the works of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Erin Manning, a series of cameos are presented: room dancing; the hold; the wiggle; the leap and the dance of the not-yet. We speculate about relations between the actual movements we could see, the in-act infused with the history of place, and the virtual potential of movement. (shrink)

Why does the problem of free will seem so intractable? I surmise that in large measure it does so because the free will debate, at least in its modern form, is conducted in terms of a mistaken approach to causality in general. At the heart of this approach is the assumption that all causation is fundamentally event causation. Of course, it is well-known that some philosophers of action want to invoke in addition an irreducible notion of agent causation, applicable only (...) in the sphere of intelligent agency. But such a view is generally dismissed as incompatible with the naturalism that has now become orthodoxy amongst mainstream analytical philosophers of mind. What I want to argue is that substances, not events, are the primary relata of causal relations and that agent causation should properly be conceived of as a species of substance causation. I shall try to show that by thus reconceiving the nature of causation and of agency, the problem of free will can be made more tractable. I shall also argue for a contention that may seem even less plausible at first sight, namely, that such a view of agency is perfectly compatible with a volitionist theory of action. (shrink)

Changes in pupil size can reflect social interest or affect, and tend to get mimicked by observers during eye contact. Pupil mimicry has recently been observed in young infants, whereas it is unkno...

Drawing on recent scholarship, with essays by a selection of international scholars, this volume throws new light on the literary persona of Peter Abelard, one of the most diversely gifted people of the Middle Ages.

This paper considers a possible national cultural and scientific synthesis which failed to take place: namely the integration of the Central European theoretical physicist Erwin Schrödinger into the primarily experimental orientations of the Oxford physics of the 1930s. We also consider the effect of the Oxford social and intellectual atmosphere generally, incluing the persistence of previous traditions which undervalued Science relative to the Arts, and University research relative to tutorial provision in the Colleges. The Oxford situation is then briefly contrasted (...) to that which Schrödinger later found in Dublin between 1939 and 1956, and which was to have a significantly more productive outcome. (shrink)

We argue that on logical grounds the constructivist algorithms mentioned by Quartz & Sejnowski (Q&S) do not resolve the learning paradox. In contrast, a neural network might acquire a more powerful structure by means of phase transitions. The latter kind of developmental mechanism can be in agreement with the constructivist manifesto.

The questions of observational error and ambiguity of interpretation that have been raised in connection with the reported observation of a magnetic monopole have precipitated a situation calling for some further insight into the pairing principles of nature. A basic distinction relates to whether or not a pair is “ordered” (e.g., sexual pair) or without a priori order (e.g., mirror pair). It is shown that the polarity of electric charge is to be regarded as an example of pairing without an (...) intrinsic a priori order. It then follows that “action” also exhibits a pairing without a priori order. The relation ofPC andTC to unordered and ordered pairing is discussed, with neutral kaon pairing as a striking example of ordered pairing. The pairing of magnetic charge, if it exists, becomes an ordered pairing! (shrink)

A study has been made of the probabilities of marriage of females and males aged 15–49 (either as a whole or in 5-year age groups) in two Outer Hebridean islands, Harris and Barra. The results were compared with ages of marriage and with the frequencies of permanent celibacy. The marriages took place between 1861 and 1990.

This essay explores how economic theory and historical inquiry were brought together for one of the first times in modern political thought in Books II and III of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. It shows how the theory of capital found in Book II provides a perspective for thinking about historical development and political institutions that is in sharp contrast with the historical record traced out in Book III. Smith's solution to the problem of reconciling economic theory and history lies (...) in a complex understanding of the nature of rational economic behaviour and how it has been affected by uncertainty and institutional development in human history. Embedded in Smith's political economy is not only a new theory of economic life, but a new political understanding of the importance of history to contemporary political life. (shrink)

Active time reversal in the sense of “object reversal” and passive time reversal in the sense of a frame reversal of time are discussed separately and then together so as to bring out their dual nature. An understanding of that duality makes it unavoidable to contrast symmetry properties of matter with symmetry properties to be assigned to antimatter. Only frame reversal of time can “see” all conceivable active time reversals relevant to physical objects. Only frame reversal of time can be (...) used for a meaningful extension of the Neumann principle to the time domain. (shrink)

In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...) to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge. (shrink)

Following the lead of Gustav Bergmann ( 1967 ), if not his precise terminology, ontologies are sometimes divided into those that are ‘relational’ and those that are ‘constituent’ (Wolterstorff 1970 ). Substance ontologies in the Aristotelian tradition are commonly thought of as being constituent ontologies, because they typically espouse the hylemorphic dualism of Aristotle ’s Metaphysics – a doctrine according to which an individual substance is always a combination of matter and form. But an alternative approach drawing more on the (...) fourfold ontological scheme of Aristotle’s Categories is not committed to this doctrine and may regard individual (or ‘primary’) substances as having no constituent structure, their only possible complexity residing in their possession, in some cases, of a multiplicity of substantial parts. However, as we shall see, this does not imply that such an ontology falls instead into the relational camp: for although it invokes, in addition to the category of individual substance, also those of substantial kind (‘secondary’ substance), attribute, and mode (or ‘individual accident’), it need not and arguably should not take there to be external relations between entities in the different categories. On this view, truths of exemplification and instantiation, such as ‘Dobbin is white’ and ‘Dobbin is a horse’, do not need relational truthmakers. Hence, it can be maintained that there are no such relations as ‘exemplification’ and ‘instantiation’, at most only certain relational truths of exemplification and instantiation – truths whose logical form is relational. Th is being so, I shall argue, such an ontology cannot fairly be classified as a ‘relational’ one. (shrink)