This article focuses on what bodies know yet which cannot be expressed verbally. We started with a problem encountered during conventional interviewing in an ex-mining community in south Wales when some teen girls struggled to speak. This led us to focus on the body, corporeality and movement in improvisational dance workshops. By slowing down and speeding up video footage from the workshops, we notice movement patterns and speculate about how traces of gender body-movement practices developed within mining communities over time (...) become actualised in girls’ habitual movement repertoires. Inspired by the works of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Erin Manning, a series of cameos are presented: room dancing; the hold; the wiggle; the leap and the dance of the not-yet. We speculate about relations between the actual movements we could see, the in-act infused with the history of place, and the virtual potential of movement. (shrink)

Changes in pupil size can reflect social interest or affect, and tend to get mimicked by observers during eye contact. Pupil mimicry has recently been observed in young infants, whereas it is unkno...

Drawing on recent scholarship, with essays by a selection of international scholars, this volume throws new light on the literary persona of Peter Abelard, one of the most diversely gifted people of the Middle Ages.

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments (...) against both claims. (shrink)

This paper considers a possible national cultural and scientific synthesis which failed to take place: namely the integration of the Central European theoretical physicist Erwin Schrödinger into the primarily experimental orientations of the Oxford physics of the 1930s. We also consider the effect of the Oxford social and intellectual atmosphere generally, incluing the persistence of previous traditions which undervalued Science relative to the Arts, and University research relative to tutorial provision in the Colleges. The Oxford situation is then briefly contrasted (...) to that which Schrödinger later found in Dublin between 1939 and 1956, and which was to have a significantly more productive outcome. (shrink)

We argue that on logical grounds the constructivist algorithms mentioned by Quartz & Sejnowski (Q&S) do not resolve the learning paradox. In contrast, a neural network might acquire a more powerful structure by means of phase transitions. The latter kind of developmental mechanism can be in agreement with the constructivist manifesto.

A well-chosen selection of readings from ancient and medieval philosophy, including such seldom-anthologized figures as Origen, Tertullian, Walter Burley, and Pomponazzi, and such seldom anthologized works as Augustine's De Magistro. One outstanding feature of the book is the inclusion of new translations of the pre-Socratics by John Wilkinson and of Aquinas' On Being and Essence by John Wellmuth. Several selections from Aquinas and Scotus plus Burley's On the Existence of Universals appear in English for the first time, all translated by (...) Wellmuth. Chapter introductions vary considerably in quality. This is probably the best work of its kind available.—A. E. J. (shrink)

In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...) to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge. (shrink)

The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true (...) or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic. (shrink)

Peter Graham argues against the prima facie plausible thesis that one can be directly blameworthy only for one’s conduct—that is, only for one’s actions or omissions to act. Because this thesis serves as a premise in a challenging recent argument for the revisionist conclusion that we’re at most rarely directly blameworthy for anything, Graham’s argument holds out a promise of contributing to a defense of a wide range of commonsense ascriptions of blameworthiness. After reconstructing Graham’s argument for the possibility of (...) direct blameworthiness for non-conduct, I develop the following objection to it: in light of a clear counterexample, one of Graham’s two premises must be weakened, which in turn requires that Graham’s other premise be strengthened; unfortunately, the resulting strengthened premise is implausible on balance. (shrink)

The nonadditive properties of mass make it desirable to abandon mass as a basis unit in physics and to replace it by a unit of the dimension of the quantum of action [h]. The ensuing four-unit system of action, charge, length, and time [h, q, l, t] interacts in a much more elucidating fashion with experiment and with the fundamental structure of physics. All space-time differential forms expressing fundamental laws of physics are forms of physical dimensions, h, h/q, or q. (...) Their occurrence as periods (residues) of period integrals of forms makes h and q topological invariants in space-time and stresses in general the global nature of quantization. The coordinate dimensions [l] and [t] only come into play for the form-coefficients, the metric tensor, and their tensorial relatives. One thus obtains a very natural guidance for implementing the principle of general covariance, when coordinate-based descriptions are necessary. The consequences for the general theory of relativity are discussed. (shrink)

Ted Honderich's 'Radical Externalism' concerning the nature of consciousness is a refreshing, and in many ways very appealing, approach to a long- standing and seemingly intractable philosophical conundrum. Although I sympathize with many of his motivations in advancing the theory and share his hostility for certain alternative approaches that are currently popular, I will serve him better by playing devil's advocate than by simply recording my points of agreement with him. If his theory is a good one, it should be (...) able to stand up to the strongest criticisms that we can muster against it. I shall do my best to articulate some of those criticisms as forcefully as I can. (shrink)

s div class="title" a terTwo Notions of Being: Entity and Essence s /div a ter - Volume 62 - E. J. Lowe.